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We, the representatives of the peoples of the world, assembled in
Geneva from 10-12 December 2003 for the first phase of the
World Summit on the Information Society, declare our common
desire and commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and
development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can
create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge,
enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their
full potential in promoting their sustainable development and
improving their quality of life, premised on the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting
fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Declaration of Principles, “Building the Information Society: A
Global Challenge in the New Millennium”
These words preface the political plan of action adopted by the World Summit
on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva in December 2003. This was not the
first time the international community had set out to draft policy on information
and communication issues in a global arena. 
Information and communication have occupied the United Nations
system since its early years. In the first years after the war, optimism prevailed:
technological advances were seen to hold the promise of enabling all the peoples
of the world to exchange and diffuse information at will, thereby promoting
knowledge and mutual understanding among peoples and nations. As early as
1946, one year after the UN was founded, the ‘free flow of information’ principle
Chapter 11
From NWICO to global governance
of the information society
Ulla Carlsson
| 193
was agreed on. Two years later, in 1948, the UN summoned its member nations
to an International Conference on Freedom of Information; that same year, the
UN also adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The principles were
adopted in consensus. The framework for the normative role UNESCO assumed
in this period is perhaps best captured in the following excerpts from the two
principal documents:
All states should proclaim policies under which the free flow of information
within countries and across frontiers will be protected. The right to seek
and transmit information should be insured in order to enable the public to
ascertain facts and appraise events… (Calling of an International
Conference on Freedom of Information, FN resolution 1946-12-14).
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regard-
less of frontiers (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, FN
1948-12-10).
It was with the founding of the UN and UNESCO that norm-setting in relation to
information and communication was elaborated on an international plane.
Otherwise, communication was one of the very first sectors to be subjected to
international regulation. The International Telegraph Union (ITU, subsequently
International Telecommunication Union), one of the oldest international organi-
zations, was founded in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1947, the ITU was made
a specialized agency of the United Nations and charged with regulating and plan-
ning telecommunications services throughout the world.
In the beginning, the normative role of the UN and UNESCO was
closely aligned with work relating to the protection of human rights, but in the
1960s technological advances in the field of telecommunication introduced a
need for international regulation of an entirely new kind, such as rules for the use
of space for communications satellites. Consequently, questions concerning infor-
mation assumed a new political valence or charge, and discussion of them
revolved increasingly around the doctrine of free flows of information. The spirit
of consensus that had prevailed in 1948 had degenerated into a climate of con-
frontation and conflict. The debate was to have a crucial influence on the work of
UNESCO, which was the main arena for these issues for nearly twenty years, from
the late 1960s to the mid-1980s.
Chronic imbalances in international information flows became the
focus of attention, and a new doctrine concerning ‘the free flow of information’
emerged. The situation had its roots in the tumultuous process of national libera-
tion from imperial powers that had swept through Asia and Africa in the preced-
ing decade. The new states demanded recognition of their sovereignty –in poli-
tics, economics and the cultural sphere. At the same time, the new nations were
in need of aid from the industrialized countries of the North. National and eco-
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nomic development was the first priority, and the mass media were seen to play
key roles in the process.
In the Cold War era the newly independent countries of the third
world were of strategic importance to both East and West. Development aid was
an important factor in ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of developing nations.
New patron-client relationships emerged; old, established ones changed. The suc-
cesses achieved by the oil-producing countries of OPEC in the 1970s strength-
ened the position of the third world as a bargaining partner (albeit rising fuel
prices had serious impacts on some developing countries). In succeeding years,
the third world made its voice heard in international fora as never before, formu-
lating programmes for far-reaching reform. A set of demands that would result in
a New International Economic Order was put on the agenda; demands for reform
of existing patterns of news and information flows –in short: a new international
information order– were soon to follow. But a new international information
order, in the sense its advocates intended, was not to be. After some brief years
of debate, the issue disappeared from international agendas, and discussion of a
New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) also waned in the
North –though not in the South.
In the first years of the new millennium, information and communica-
tion issues have resurfaced in the global arena in a somewhat different guise: the
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The UN, UNESCO and the ITU
are all involved in the new arena, where information and communication issues
are primarily treated in terms relating to ‘global governance’. It is these most
recent developments that form the starting point for the present chapter, which
analyses the rise and fall of the NWICO with particular attention to structural and
institutional aspects of the media and communication system and the actions of
various actors in the arena of international politics1. With the NWICO as a back-
drop, a discussion then follows of the information order of today in relation to
processes of globalization, media developments in third world countries and, ulti-
mately, our understanding of ‘development’. The chapter concludes with a few
remarks concerning the efforts being made within the framework of the WSIS to
apply a governance perspective to fundamental issues relating to information and
communication in the world today.
The international media system
The principal complaints that the third world voiced in the 1970s, and which
subsequently evolved into the demand for a new international information
order, concerned the imbalance of information flows (in the case of news vir-
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1 The findings of the study are reported in full in Ulla Carlsson, Frågan om en ny internationell informa-
tionsordning; en studie i internationell mediepolitik (The issue of a New World and Information Order; a
study in media politics), Göteborg: Göteborg University, Dept. of Journalism and Mass Communication,
1998. See also Ulla Carlsson, “The Rise and Fall of NWICO. From a Vision of International Regulation to
a Reality of Multilevel Governance”, Nordicom Review (2003) 2, pp. 31-68.
tually a ‘one-way flow’); the general disrespect for third world peoples’ cultur-
al identities that the imbalance reflected; the hegemony of transnational com-
munications companies (perceived as a threat to the nations’ independence)
and the inequitable distribution of communications resources among regions
of the world.
A rich body of research confirmed the validity of the complaints.
The studies documented the imbalance of flows between developed and
developing countries, between North and South. The international system of
communications was designed to serve the needs of the industrialized coun-
tries. A small number of transnational companies controlled the markets for
news and for communications technology. Developing countries had no choice
but to make use of the structures created by and for the industrialized regions
of the world. National media systems in the third world remained poorly devel-
oped; many were state-controlled. Poorly developed and economically weak,
mass media were unable to report news events in their own countries or to
report world events to their national audiences. As a consequence, they were
heavily dependent on international news agencies. The material these agen-
cies carried was strongly event-oriented and superficial, personifying and
dramatizing events of the day (Bishop, 1975; Boyd-Barrett, 1977; Harris, 1976;
Höhne, 1977; Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974; Tunstall, 1977; Schramm, 1980;
Varis, 1977).
Mass media in the development process: ideology
and strategy
The two main focal points in the issue of a new international information order
were the role of the media and mass communication in the development of soci-
ety and the relationship between industrialized and developing countries. 
The development process was strategically important in the industrial-
ized countries’ contest for the third world. The emergence of new media technol-
ogy highlighted the role of the media in this process. Scholars who studied
national development in the postwar era through the 1960s identified phenome-
na in the development process that formed the nuclei of two separate paradigms:
the paradigm of modernization and the paradigm of dependence, the latter a
reaction to the former. Whereas the modernization paradigm saw the problems
of developing countries as consequences of historical factors, the dependency
paradigm pointed to contemporary causes: underdevelopment as a consequence
of capitalism, expressed as colonialism and imperialism.
The ‘free flow of information’ concept was formulated in the USA in
the final throes of the Second World War. No national frontiers should be allowed
to hinder the flow of information between countries. Even while the war was still
raging, it was apparent that the USA would emerge from it as a world power. The
Americans saw before them a world without colonial ties, a world that lay open
to a robust, expansive American economy. The information sector was a key fac-
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tor in paving the way for economic expansion. People everywhere were tired of
the propaganda and censorship that were part of the war effort and welcomed
the thought of ‘free flows’ warmly. The idea of a ‘free flow of information’ was
spread over the world. It was particularly important to win support for the con-
cept in the United Nations and especially its specialized agency, UNESCO (United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation). Thus, UNESCO came
to be the main arena in which information and communication issues were
debated in the postwar period.
UNESCO had two prime roles: it provided assistance and it established
norms. The first of these roles related directly to the development effort and
‘modernization’. But when, in the 1960s, proponents of the dependency para-
digm called the concept of modernization into question and demanded reform, it
was the first of what came to be known as the ‘wars of ideas’. The ideological
components of the two paradigms provided the terms for the will to reform rep-
resented in the call for a new international information order, and UNESCO’s
norm-setting role was to become the portal through which the third world’s
demands made their way onto the international agenda (cf. Eek, 1979).
The rise of the NWICO
The non-aligned countries introduced the demand for a new international infor-
mation order in the mid-1970s as an extension of already voiced demands for a
new world economic order. Although the non-aligned countries could hardly be
considered a unit in terms of ideology or political-economic systems, and as a
group had leanings toward both of the major blocs, they maintained a remark-
ably united front on the issue of a new international information order (cf. Sing
and Gross, 1984). That the demand for reform of the international communica-
tions system arose out of the non-aligned camp was hardly sheer chance
(Hamelink, 1979). A prime factor was the tumultuous change that was taking
place in the world oil market. The ‘OPEC Crisis’ or ‘fuel crisis’ of 1973 broke a
position of near-total dominance that the USA had enjoyed for over a century and
won the non-aligned countries an unprecedented bargaining position.
After 1973, the issue was no longer a question of national liberation
in a strictly political, juridical sense but ambitions extended into the economic and
cultural spheres as well, which, of course, sharply challenged prevailing power
relationships. The new international information order rested on four corner-
stones, the ‘four Ds’: democratization of the flows of information between coun-
tries; decolonialization, i.e. self-determination, national independence and cultur-
al identity; demonopolization, i.e. setting limits on the activities of transnational
communications companies; and development, i.e. national communication poli-
cy, strengthening of infrastructure, journalism education, and regional coopera-
tion (cf. Nordenstreng, 1984). The media, particularly news flows, were central. A
new way of looking at development was evident; its ingredients were tenets
arguing that development presumes self-determination and cultural identity, and
| 197
Ulla Carlsson
recipient countries should control the aid received. Add to this an international
perspective, and a commitment to regional cooperation.
The third world’s complaints and the demands for a new international
information order that were raised in UNESCO developed into a bitter struggle
that came to a head in the work on a ‘declaration on the media’ in the period
1974-19782. But it was issues relating to satellite communication and the need to
regulate the new technology which portended a change in climate within
UNESCO. The General Conference of 1972 adopted a resolution put forward by
the Soviet Union that set out principles for how satellites might be used for the
exchange of news, information and cultural expressions3. The vote was 55 for, 7
against, with 22 abstentions. Astoundingly, the USA had been outvoted. In the
ensuing years, the West frequently found itself in the minority as third world
countries tended to vote with the Eastern bloc.
The MacBride Commission
Just as the strife surrounding the Declaration on the Media was culminating in
1976, a commission was appointed with the brief of analysing existing problems
relating to communication in the world and suggesting principles that might
guide work towards a new world information order4 –from 1978 ‘a new world
information and communication order’, or NWICO5. The commission, chaired by
the Irish politician, diplomat and Nobel Laureate Sean MacBride, submitted its
final report, Many Voices, One World. Communication and Society, Today and
Tomorrow, to Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, Director-General of UNESCO, just before
the 1980 General Conference. The sharp differences that had characterized the
discussions throughout the 1970s were also present in the MacBride
Commission. Considering that it consisted of 16 members representing different
ideologies, different political, economic and cultural systems, and different geo-
graphical areas, it was no small achievement for the Commission to manage to
reach agreement on as many points as it did. Sean MacBride comments in his
Foreword to Many Voices, One World that the members “reached what I consid-
er a surprising measure of agreement on major issues, upon which opinions
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2 The UNESCO Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media
to Strengthen Peace and International Understanding to the Promotion of Human Rights and to
Countering Racialism, Apartheid and the Incitement of War (1978). The Declaration may be seen as an
attempt to formulate fundamental guidelines for the role of mass media in the international system.
3 Guiding principles on the use of satellite broadcasting for the free flow of information, the spread of
education and greater cultural exchange.
4 The International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, or MacBride Commission,
was appointed in 1976. One of its principal tasks was to “analyse communication problems, in their dif-
ferent aspects, within the perspective of the establishment of a new international economic order and of
the measures to be taken to foster the institution of a ‘new world information order’” (UNESCO Work
Plan for 1977-1978, 19C/5 Approved, §4155).
5 UNESCO used the concept of a ‘new world information order’ for only two years. In the final version of
the mass media declaration adopted in 1978 the phrasing is: “…a new, more just and effective world
information and communication order”. The change may be seen as a further adaptation to the position
of the West, and as a retreat from a new order to improvements in the status quo.
heretofore had seemed irreconcilable” (xviii). Due to differences in the group, the
report does not offer any specific proposals regarding communication policy prin-
ciples. On the other hand, it does offer a good number of recommendations and
suggestions aiming to bring about a “more just and more efficient world infor-
mation and communication order”. A majority of those who commented on the
report, including many who were essentially critical, agreed that Many Voices,
One World was the most thoroughgoing document of its kind on communication
to have been produced in UNESCO’s name (cf. Hamelink, 1980).
The Commission report stressed that it concerned not only develop-
ing countries, but the whole of humanity, because unless the necessary
changes were made in all parts of the world, it would not be possible to attain
freedom, reciprocity or independence in the exchange of information world-
wide. The Commission confirmed the persistence of imbalances in news and
information flows between countries and of marked inequalities in the distri-
bution of communication resources. The Commission were agreed as to the
necessity for change and that the current situation was “unacceptable to all“
(xviii), but its members were unable to agree on a definition of the concept of
a ‘new world information and communication order’ (NWICO), nor were they
able to specify the link with a new international economic order, as they had
been asked to do. 
Above all, the Commission sought solutions whereby third world
countries would develop and strengthen their independence, self-determination
and cultural identity. They also explored ways to improve international news
reporting and the conditions under which journalists operate. Several central pro-
posals focused on the democratization of communication, i.e. issues relating to
access and participation, and “the right to communicate” –actually a cluster of
rights: “the right to be informed, the right to inform, the right to privacy, the
right to participate in public communication” at all levels, international, national,
local and individual, was strongly emphasized (265, 173). 
Although its mandate embraced all forms of communication, the prin-
cipal focus of the MacBride Commission rested on the mass media. The mobiliz-
ing capacity of the media was emphasized in relation to issues of national devel-
opment, while the media’s role as a source of continuity was emphasized in rela-
tion to cultural identity. The Commission described the media’s contributions to
social change and the preservation of national cultural identity. Thus, we find
expressions of both change and integration perspectives. But in contrast to the
international perspective of the third world countries, the approach of the
MacBride Commission was decidedly national. 
Overall, the Commission applied a development perspective to condi-
tions in the third world. Most calls for action were addressed to the developing
countries, whereas the role of the industrialized world was largely confined to
that of donor. Although the Commission’s recommendations were far more con-
crete than is common in UNESCO, only seldom did they refer to actors by name.
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That is to say, the recommendations were strategic in nature rather than action-
oriented, which, it should be noted, were necessary if agreement was to be
reached on the principles for a NWICO. With regard to commercialization of the
mass media and measures to limit the activities of transnational companies, the
Commission’s recommendations were elevated to the systems level and formulat-
ed in very general terms. Thus, the report offered nothing in the way of a blue-
print for change, which was a disappointment to many. On the other hand, the
Commission did support many of the demands that the third world countries had
formulated in ‘the four Ds’. 
When the time came for the work of the MacBride Commission to be
debated at UNESCO’s General Conference in 1980, it became apparent that
Director-General M’Bow had changed his position. Previously a proponent of the
third world countries’ demands, he now assumed a role of mediator. The recom-
mendations of the MacBride Commission were conspicuously absent from the
agenda. Nonetheless, they were frequently referred to in the debate and influ-
enced the formulation of what was to be known as ‘the MacBride Resolution’
that was the outcome of the Conference. For the first time, a UNESCO resolu-
tion set out the foundations of a new world information and communication
order, or NWICO. It contained paragraphs on measures to remove hindrances
and remedy other negative effects (monopolization and concentration), to pro-
mote freedom of information and freedom of the press, to provide for journal-
ists’ freedom and responsibility and to ensure a diversity of sources, to help pre-
serve cultural identity, and to ensure the right to participate in information flows
and access to information sources. All these elements were present, albeit in a
more diluted form than in the MacBride report, not to mention the third world
countries’ demands for reform. 
Of the focal themes in Many Voices, One World, only cultural identity is
included in the resolution text. It proved impossible to reach agreement on inde-
pendence, self-determination and the ‘right to communicate’. The most far-reach-
ing of the Commission’s recommendations, those relating to democratization of
communication, were reflected in three clauses on the right to participate in infor-
mation flows and processes and to have a ‘right to communicate’. The text was a
grave disappointment to the non-aligned countries. The most concrete sections of
the resolution had to do with development and aid. These emphases were further
reinforced by the institution of an International Programme for Communication
Development (IPDC), another indirect fruit of the MacBride Commission. 
The UNESCO 1980 General Conference: a turning-point? 
The 1980 General Conference approached amidst mounting uncertainty about
the future of UNESCO. The third world’s demands for radical reform of the pre-
vailing information order were perceived by some in the West as a threat to the
‘free world’, i.e. as “freedom under attack” (Fascell, 1979). Many Western coun-
tries perceived the movement as an “effort by the Soviet Union and some Third
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World countries to foster government control of media under the guise of a New
World and Communication Order” (Goddard-Power, 1981: 142). 
Meanwhile, fatigue was widespread within UNESCO, and many dele-
gates felt that some change was necessary if the organization were to live on in
keeping with its statutes. Media issues had dominated UNESCO’s agenda for
most of the 1970s, with wars of words and ideas being waged on two front lines:
East vs. West and North vs. South. Towards the end of the decade there were
even public doubts that UNESCO could be fully functional if the inflamed debate
on communications media continued for much longer. Both the USA and Great
Britain threatened to leave UNESCO on repeated occasions. Media issues were
not the sole cause of this turmoil; the leadership style of Director-General M’Bow
was also highly controversial and contributed to the deadlock (Gerbner, Mowlana
and Nordenstreng, 1993).
By 1980 there was a general will, both among the countries of the
Eastern and the Western blocs and within the third world, to reach some kind of a
modus vivendi on media issues so that the atmosphere within UNESCO might nor-
malize. Even the Soviet delegation showed signs of a willingness to compromise, a
change in attitude deriving from the political repercussions of the country’s inva-
sion of Afghanistan the year before. It came as a surprise to many when UNESCO
members at the 1980 meeting managed to agree on both a first draft of a NWICO
and a development program (IPDC). In addition, third world countries met with
much more support for their demands than ever before in a UNESCO document,
even though the MacBride Commission’s recommendations had been struck from
the agenda. The work of the Commission had, however, cleared the path, which
benefited the third world countries in several respects. The ideas of the non-
aligned countries had won recognition. UNESCO members were able to agree on
several fundaments for a new world information and communication order, sever-
al of which corresponded with the intentions of the non-aligned countries.
Surprisingly, even a clause on monopolization and concentration of the media won
approval. The industrialized countries promised aid to help to build and develop
communication systems in developing countries. One can take this as evidence
that the third world advanced its position and that the NWICO concept had won
some measure of acceptance. At the same time, the West put development and
aid issues squarely on the agenda and managed to turn the focus away from their
own roles and onto conditions in the third world countries. The international
dimension was diluted, as it had been in the MacBride Commission’s work. In this
we can perceive a crossroads for UNESCO on the horizon, a point at which the
organization would have to choose between continued work on a new informa-
tion order and a more decided focus on development and aid issues.
From regulation to international aid
After 1980, UNESCO’s General Conference adopted one international agreement
having bearing on the information and communication sector (Right to
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Communicate, 1983). Otherwise, the only resolutions emanating from UNESCO
related to the communication program, IPDC. These were clear indications of a
different climate and different power relationships from those of the preceding
decade, in which UNESCO produced no fewer than eight international agree-
ments on information and communication. The bitter debates of the period over
issues like freedom of information, social responsibility of the media, the free flow
of information, news imperialism and, ultimately, a world information and com-
munication order form a parenthesis in UNESCO’s history to date. The NWICO
question was dead, ‘history’, and practical development assistance moved to cen-
tre stage. The factors behind the change can be summarized in four points.
» First, the MacBride Commission made a significant contribution by
structuring the problem area, which made it possible to raise the intel-
lectual level of the debate. The issues were made concrete through
the solutions the Commission proposed. The Commission’s emphasis
on development was also a step in the direction of change. 
» Secondly, the institution of the IPDC became a symbol of the new
emphasis on development and practical action, an emphasis that was
to grow successively stronger during the 1980s as the development
program progressed. Development aid was once again the prime
focus. The Western countries were enthusiastic about the IPDC and
considered it their work. There were very likely tactical motives
behind their standpoint; an emphasis on practical assistance might
serve to modify the demands of third world countries and reduce the
severity of the ideological conflicts (Garbo, 1984; Goddard-Power,
1984; Harley, 1984; Nordenstreng, 1984). But were it not for the
MacBride Commission’s focus on development issues, it is not likely
that the programme would have seen the light of day.
» Third, the change in posture of UNESCO’s Director-General in
response to widespread criticism of his ineffective leadership and
favouring of the developing countries was important in this context.
The preoccupation with issues relating to the mass media had, what is
more, nearly paralysed UNESCO. The survival and proper functioning
of the organization required a change and forced the Director-General
to modify his policy by, for example, striking the 82 recommendations
of the MacBride report from the agenda in 1980, assuming instead
the role of mediator.
» Fourth, and finally, the friction subsided when the USA and Great
Britain first threatened to leave and then left UNESCO in 1984 and
1985, respectively. The USA pointed to the work on the NWICO as
one of its reasons for leaving the organization. After the 1980 meet-
ing, the USA and other Western countries launched an anti-NWICO
campaign. A document known as the Talloire Declaration, adopted by
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an international conference arranged by the World Press Freedom
Committee et alii in 1981, exemplifies the critique. UNESCO was also
criticized for inefficiency and for having become ‘politicized’. The
prominence and influence of third world countries in UNESCO in the
early 1980s, a result of Director-General M’Bow’s policies, was a
source of constant irritation (Bartelson and Ringmar, 1985). The USA
had additional complaints, as well. The foreign policy of the newly
installed Reagan Administration differed markedly from that of the
Carter Administration (Gerbner, 1993; Levin, 1984). The exit of two
major powers dealt a hard blow to UNESCO’s finances, which resulted
in a shift in the power constellation within the organization. The posi-
tion of the Director-General was weakened, the Western countries
advanced their position at the expense of third world countries, and
the Eastern bloc was relatively passive.
Even after 1985, the third world countries continued their campaign for a
NWICO, but to no avail. Their influence had been reduced, partly due to the
fact that OPEC no longer wielded the same degree of influence on the oil mar-
ket. Armed conflicts between several of the OPEC countries meant that the
non-aligned countries could not muster a united front as they had in the 1970s.
It was impossible for individual countries both to campaign for a NWICO and to
seek more assistance from the countries that opposed it. As a consequence, at
the 1989 General Conference NWICO was taken off the agenda once and for
all, leaving the stage open for ‘free flow’ to make its comeback (cf. MacBride
and Roach, 1993).
Full circle
The efforts of third world countries to bring about thoroughgoing reform of the
information and communication order within the framework of UNESCO, the
principal norm-setting international forum in this area, failed. A political idea had
to be sacrificed for the sake of development assistance. The successively narrow-
ing focus on aid issues in the 1980s represents a reversion to the thinking of the
1960s. In retrospect, one might say that policy came full circle with the institution
of the IPDC communication programme in 1989. UNESCO’s role vis-á-vis the
developing countries was once again that of aid donor.
Thus, the issue of a new world information and communication order
(NWICO) was apparently an expression of the spirit of the times, an era of ideo-
logical debate and conflict, a period in which power relationships on interna-
tional markets were challenged and changed. The issue of a NWICO, as formu-
lated in the 1970s within UNESCO, was an outgrowth of the two development
paradigms and its ideological components. In a longer perspective, we also see
that the 1970s formed a period of transition, from politics and ideology to mar-
ket solutions.
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The 1950s and ‘60s were, overall, optimistic. Wealthy countries pros-
pered, poor countries gained their independence. People had faith in political
solutions, believed in the promise of new technology and economic growth. But
in the 1970s this faith weakened; ideological conflicts surfaced, the status quo
was questioned, and collective solutions were advanced. The 1980s, then, saw
the disintegration of many of the very institutions that had inspired optimism
twenty and thirty years earlier. Deregulation, commercialization, consumerism
and individualism became watchwords. The change was clearly linked to the
advance of technology-driven globalization. Whereas a new economic world
order could be discerned as early as the 1970s, it was only in the following
decade that a new political world order emerged. The driving forces behind this
latter metamorphosis were quite beyond the reach of the international political
system; they were also, ideologically speaking, quite contrary to the thinking
behind the NWICO concept.
Globalization in the media sector
Mass media play a decisive part in what we call the globalization process.
Without the media and modern information technology, globalization as we
know it today would not be possible. Access to various media, to telephony and
to digital services, is often held to be crucial to our political, economic and cultur-
al development. Free and independent media are also vital to the survival and
development of democracy. Meanwhile, a good proportion of the people of the
world lack electricity and access to telecommunications and are thereby con-
demned to marginalization.
The development of innovative information technologies and the
ongoing processes of deregulation and concentration of ownership have spurred
the pace of globalization. Specifically communications satellites and digitalization
–not least the Internet– have had an enormous impact. These innovations have
opened up worldwide markets for media products such as television pro-
grammes, films, news, games and advertising. They have been a sine qua non for
the formation and proper functioning of global enterprises and flows of informa-
tion across national frontiers. The production and distribution of media products
are highly concentrated branches, with respect to both content and ownership.
Meanwhile, traditional distinctions, between information and entertainment,
between hardware and software, between product and distribution, are blurring.
Much of what could be discerned only vaguely on the horizon back in
the 1970s is now upon us in full force. The volume of information we have at our
disposal has multiplied many times over; it is available via many new players and
many new channels in ‘the new information society’. The relationships between
the wealthy countries and the poor countries of the world that the MacBride
Commission described at the end of the 1970s still seem to prevail, essentially
unchanged, albeit some of the terminology is new. Today we speak of ‘the digital
divide’, which, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan points out, actually consists of
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several ‘divides’: a technological divide in terms of existing infrastructure; a con-
tent divide in the sense that much of the information available on the web lacks
all relevance to people’s real needs, while it also presumes fluency in English; a
gender divide, in that women and girls generally have poorer access to informa-
tion than men and boys; and a commercial divide, whereby electronic trading
tends to strengthen the links between some countries, with the risk that others
will be increasingly marginalized6.
Global actors in the media market
Much of the debate about a NWICO in the 1970s revolved around news flows
across national frontiers. Studies made in the 1970s confirmed a decided imbal-
ance in the flows between North and South. One of the main demands regarding
a NWICO was the call for a more equitable and democratic flow of information;
initially, this mainly meant flows of news.
The objects of the non-aligned countries’ criticism were mainly the
major wire services that operated worldwide: AP, AFP, dpa, Reuters and UPI.
Because of their dominance they were held responsible for the ‘one-way flow’ of
news and other information between North and South.
The international wire services were pioneers in the development of a
global network. Having started up in the early 1850s, they were the first transna-
tional media systems, products of modernity. They defined political and econom-
ic news, thereby creating a product that was sold, in different packaging, to polit-
ical and economic elites, either directly or via the mass media, at home and in
other parts of the world. The wire services developed information technologies in
order to improve the global communications networks. Today, they distinguish
themselves from other actors on the global market in that they both contribute to
globalization and consolidate their own countries (Hjarvard, 2001).
Contemporary news flows differ from those in the 1970s in their much
larger volume and greater diversification. But interest in using sources other than
the major wire services is limited, so they have retained their privilege of defining
what constitutes news. Particularly the market leaders AP and Reuters also supply
Internet services with news copy. Here there is a natural link with the main sources
of news film. The news market today is highly diversified and segmented into a
number of subgenres –business news, sports news, entertainment news, medical
news– and the Internet facilitates further development, in terms of both geograph-
ical extent and volume. But the content the services carry does not seem to have
evolved to any notable extent. When CNN ‘stole’ a sizable share of the global mar-
ket in the mid-1990s, the dominance of the USA in news reporting worldwide was
the target of criticism, and researchers found that “the news seen on World Report
is the same old news of the world” (Fluornoy and Stewart, 1997: 23).
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6 Address by UN Secretary-General Annan to the World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva,
December 10, 2003.
Some collaboration between established news agencies (EBU) and
news agencies in the third world was established in the 1980s as a direct conse-
quence of the NWICO debate. Danish media scholar Stig Hjarvard, who has stud-
ied the exchange of news footage within Eurovision, found that Asia (Asiavision)
is the only region where the EBU regularly gathered news in the 1990s.
Otherwise, use of third world sources was no more than sporadic. Less than 4%
of the material carried by EBU’s news exchange, EVN, in 1991 originated in
regional collaboration with third world news organizations. To some extent, the
sparse representation may be attributed to a scarcity of material that is of rele-
vance to EBU’s viewers. Hjarvard analysed the obstacles and disinterest that col-
laboration had met on the national level and commented that it seemed to occur
despite, rather than as a result of, national policy. Interest resides among journal-
ists, not governments (Hjarvard, 1995: 505).
But even if regional collaboration has not brought about any major
changes, regionalization of news reporting has developed, particularly in the
Arab world. The news service Al jazeera is a case in point. But this is not to say
that Al jazeera is a major news source outside the Arab world.
An examination of the structure of the production and distribution of
media products does not turn up any thoroughgoing changes since the 1970s as
far as news flows are concerned. Researcher Oliver Boyd-Barrett presumes that
nothing has changed and points out that the most problematic aspect today
resides not so much in the skew geopolitical pattern of news diffusion, as in the
effects of the very narrow range of news content carried, the focus on elites and
conventional Western news values, conflict rather than stability, and events rather
than processes (Boyd-Barrett, 1997). This is so despite the fact that, thanks to the
Internet, many more different news sources around the world are available than
was even conceivable 20-30 years ago. That is to say, there is an unprecedented
potential for both more diverse and more extensive news flows.
Transnational media companies grow even bigger
Critics of the status quo in the 1970s took the concentration in the media sector
and the threat to diversity that it posed as cause for demanding some form of
international regulation of media markets. Since then, media corporations have
grown considerably. Back in the 1970s, the objects of concern were the major
wire services and, above all, film studios that operated on the international mar-
ket, such as Columbia, Warner Brothers, Twentieth Century-Fox and United
Artists –all based in the USA. Indeed, it is among these companies that we find
the germ of many of the transnational corporations (TNC) that dominate the
media market today. Some of these companies have taken advantage of deregu-
lation and privatization over vast regions of the world and have purchased and
fused with other companies to become global media conglomerates.
The TNCs operate on multiple levels, global channels spread the same
message (in the same language), regional channels in local languages are estab-
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lished, and technical systems are made available. A few transnational media com-
panies, most of which are based in the USA or Europe, dominate the spread of
media products. Their cultural presence is considerable on virtually every conti-
nent. Lately, they have begun to establish themselves in the developing countries.
Together with the World Wide Web, the expansion of media TNCs has also
increased the paramount status of English.
Table 1. The largest media corporations in the world by media sales volume
in 2003 (USD billions)
Source: Nordicom 2004.
Most of these companies are primarily involved in television and entertainment,
but several also deal in news gathering and distribution. All control more than
one medium and are thus able to advertise and sell their products in one medium
or across others. 
Both of the two transnational corporations in the third world are to be
found in Latin America. They are Globo in Brazil and Televisa in Mexico, with vol-
umes of roughly USD 2-3 billion each (Variety Aug 26-Sep 1, 2002 and Sep 15-
21, 2003). Having started out in the newspaper branch, the two companies have
now expanded into television, pay-TV, music publishing and book publishing.
The media have become increasingly commercialized over the past few
decades. Market shares are worth a great deal of money. How economic transac-
tions are organized and the degree of concentration of economic power in various
branches play a decisive role in the globalization process. A country’s place in the
global pecking order is a function of its ability to compete on the world market.
Competitive strength is not only a question of efficiency or economic rationality;
many factors –political, social and economic– are involved. Samir Amin points out
five different monopolies that the dominant actors make use of to maintain and
strengthen their hold on the market and that together form the framework in
which globalization takes place. The five monopolies relate to technology, finance,
natural resources, media and communications, and weapons of mass destruction.
In the case of the media and communications, Amin gives the following motives:
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1. AOL Time Warner 40 USA
2. News Corporation 19 Australia
3. Viacom Inc 19 USA
4. Walt Disney Comp. 18 USA
5. Vivendi Universal 18 France
6. Bertelsmann AG 15 Germany
7. Sony Corporation 12 Japan
8. Reed Elsevier 8 The Netherlands/Great Britain
9. ARD 7 Germany
10. NBC 7 USA
…[The media and communications] not only lead to uniformity of culture
but also open up new means of political manipulation. The expansion of
the modern media market is already one of the major components in the
erosion of democratic practices in the West itself (Amin, 1997: 5). 
The media situation in the third world: status quo?
The issues of cultural identity and the right to participate in international flows of
information are related to both national media structures in the developing coun-
tries and the countries’ links with the global system. The only concrete political
result of the work on a NWICO within UNESCO was a focus on the development
of national media in the third world through, among other things, increased
development assistance.
Several countries in the third world still lack an adequate infrastructure
for modern mass media. This hinders their development, while it also blocks their
access to the international news and media system. The lack of electricity and
telecommunications over much of the developing countries’ territory is one key
problem. Other hindrances reside in the realm of national media policy. Those
who can change the situation are not always motivated to do so; those who want
to change the situation are not always in a position to do so.
An examination of existing international statistics in the communica-
tions sector shows some improvement in third world countries since the 1970s,
though in some more than others. For example, the density of radio and televi-
sion receivers has risen, as has newspaper circulation. The broadcast media have
expanded particularly markedly. In the mid-1960s UNESCO recommended that
each country should have at least 20 TV sets, 50 radio receivers and 100 newspa-
per copies per thousand inhabitants. In 1980, the MacBride report notes that 100
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America had not reached these minimum stan-
dards by the mid-1970s. Ten years later, five countries were still below the three
standards, and an additional 55 were below at least one of them. African coun-
tries predominated among these least developed countries with respect to the
media (Beam, 1992). Ten years down the line, the figures have improved further
–though only in some countries, and not others. Again, the poorest countries of
Africa lag behind. In several developing countries, the pace of progress in the
media sector has been quite slow, particularly in rural areas, where a majority of
the people live.
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Table 2. Media densities in the world, 1970 and 1997,
Units per thousand inhabitants
Source: UNESCO 2003 <http://www.uis.unesco.org>.
In the world as a whole, it is estimated that there are about 250 television sets per
thousand inhabitants, a considerably higher figure than for those who have a
telephone (Human Development Report, 2002). In less than a decade from the
mid-1980s to the mid 1990s, the number of television channels in the world dou-
bled, as did average viewing time and the number of TV sets in households.
Satellite television is accessible worldwide; transnational satellite channels have
vastly increased the volume of programming available to viewers, and numerous
niche channels carry specialized content to various target audiences –not least
young viewers. In developing countries, which have experienced rapid deregula-
tion, many Western-style radio and television channels now serve urban areas.
Feature films, serial drama, talk shows and music predominate. Still, not everyone
has access to television. In the poorest countries the estimated density of televi-
sion sets per thousand people is only 23. 
Radio is still the medium that reaches the most people. The fact that a
good share of the third world still lacks electricity makes radio crucially important
outside urban areas. Between 1970 and 1997, the density of radio receivers in
developing countries increased from 90 to 245 per thousand inhabitants. 
In the interval 1970-1997, newspaper circulation in the developing
countries doubled, from 29 to 60 per thousand. Circulation nearly doubled in the
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Daily newspapers Radio receivers TV sets 
1970 1996 1970 1997 1970 1997
The world, total 107 96 245 418 81 240
Africa 12 16 93 216 4.6 60
America 170 141 698 1,017 209 429
Asia 49 66 81 255 20 190
Europe 281 261 465 729 205 446
Oceania 269 227 779 1,071 188 427
Developing countries 29 60 90 245 9.9 157
Sub-Saharan Africa 10 12 83 202 1.5 48
Arab states 17 36 131 269 21 119
Latin America & Caribbean 76 101 196 412 57 205
Eastern Asia & Oceania 26 56 97 306 3.3 253
Southern Asia 12 33 34 118 0.9 54
Least developed countries 4.5 8 56 142 0.5 23
Developed countries 292 226 643 1,061 263 548
least developed countries as well: from 4.5 per thousand in 1970 to 8 per thou-
sand in 1997. This is still far below the UNESCO recommendations in the mid-
1960s (100 per 1,000 inhabitants). 
The Internet is generally considered the cardinal example of ‘the digi-
tal revolution’. In 2003, an estimated 11% of the world’s population had access
to the Internet (ITU, 2004). More than three-quarters of today’s Internet users
are to be found in the wealthiest (OECD) countries, which have 14% of the
world population. Only 1-2% are located in Africa. Thus, we find a huge gap
between different parts of the world –‘the digital divide’ is as wide today as it
ever was. Most prognosticators say that the new information technology will
make a tremendous difference in the future, but that a majority of the world’s
population will not have access to the net. The lack of telecommunications infra-
structure in regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America will keep many people in
the margins. 
Table 3. Internet users and telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 2003
Source: ITU 2004 <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/>.
The Internet is known to be the younger generation’s medium par excellence. But
in Africa, South America and a good part of Asia, the proportion of children and
young people who have Internet access is only a couple of per cent. Meanwhile,
roughly 90% of Swedish children have Internet access at home. Children and
young people in the wealthiest countries of the world are a truly multimedia gen-
eration, whereas for many of the children in the world television is out of reach,
and books are in short supply. 
The IPDC was inaugurated to accelerate expansion of the mass media
in the third world. But even after twenty years, the results of the programme are
modest, to say the least. In some instances, support made possible through the
IPDC has significantly contributed to regional news exchanges, and to some
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Internet users Tele subscribers
Africa 2 9
Asia 7 29
America (North) 53 111
America (South) 8 40
Europe (East) 17 74
Europe (West) 40 144
Oceania 38 95
extent it may be credited with having facilitated news gathering. But all too
often, national media policy has stood in the way of international news exchange
and news gathering across national frontiers. 
IPDC operations have been criticized widely, and in 1995 reforms
designed to make the programme more efficient got under way. But at the same
time it is difficult to see how the IPDC can help to create functional media struc-
tures. The establishment of a modern communications infrastructure is much too
costly for any one development programme. Deregulation in the third world has
opened the door to competition, privatization and foreign ownership, but this
route to development often implies new dependency relationships. 
The conditions found in the third world in the 1970s are largely
unchanged in the 100-odd countries that have experienced a slow pace of
development and are still politically and economically dependent on other coun-
tries. In these countries, the situation described in the MacBride Commission’s
report still applies. 
A third development paradigm 
The new world information order, as formulated by the non-aligned countries,
was clearly linked to the dependency paradigm, particularly the elements decolo-
nization and demonopolization. But the documents also contained an indication
of a new position in the countries’ quest for their own paths toward development
and communication; this had to do with independence, self-determination and
cultural identity. The demand for a new international information order may be
seen as a reaction to the modernization paradigm. 
The MacBride Commission was clearly influenced by the non-aligned
states’ ideas. Self-reliance and cultural identity were key principles in the
Commission’s recommendations. Concepts like access and participation were
made explicit. The Commission also introduced the local level and horizontal
communication into thinking about development. There was also a hint of the
idea that the causes of underdevelopment might be found in the developed and
the developing countries alike. This ‘new’ view was also expressed in the IPDC
resolution of 1980. 
The MacBride Commission’s recommendations were hardly unequivo-
cal, however. The ambiguities were particularly apparent in the Commission’s treat-
ment of communication technology and technological development. Here, the
Commission’s thinking alternated between the modernization and dependency
paradigms; the concept of neocolonialism confronted decolonialization. But, above
all, the recommendations suggested a third, alternative concept of development. 
In the early 1980s, some scholars and development experts began
speaking of ‘another development’, a term first coined in 1978 in Development
Dialogue, the journal published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Here, key
concepts are cultural identity and self-reliance, and access and participation. This
third approach may be characterized as a reaction to both the modernization and
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dependency paradigms. Universal models, which of necessity are always simplis-
tic, were rejected in favour of an emphasis on the characteristics and needs of
each individual country and the conviction that development efforts must start
with specific conditions and needs. Social, economic, cultural and religious com-
ponents of development were identified; and the focus rested more often on
local conditions than on the nation or international relations. This is not to say
that relationships of international interdependency were ignored. An oft-cited
phrase was “Global problems, local solutions”. Adherents of this approach also
regarded traditional values as an important factor in fostering a sense of identity
and meaning and a source of continuity in the face of social change. At the same
time, democratic processes and regard for human rights were kept in focus
(Hedebro, 1982; Kothari, 1984; Jayaweera, 1987; Kumar, 1994; Mowlana, 1988;
Servaes, 1989; Yoon, 1996).
Most recently, much of the work with ‘another development’ has
focused on the concept of multiplicity, introduced by Jan Servaes in the late
1980s. The focus on multiplicity has also entailed a focus on participatory com-
munication for social change. The approach is normative. The researchers and
field workers who subscribe to this school of thought often work on local proj-
ects to create the preconditions for new communicative situations, often on a
‘grassroots’ level.
The links between this third paradigm of development and the
NWICO debate and the ideas implicit in the MacBride resolution are obvious.
Concepts like self-reliance and cultural identity took their place on the interna-
tional agenda and thus won political acceptance on the conceptual level. The
MacBride Commission involved social scientists –sociologists, political scientists,
educationalists, media scholars, and so forth– and other experts from all parts of
the world, which ensured the inclusion of many of the concepts that were to
recur in both theory and practice in ensuing decades. It is difficult, however, to
distinguish cause from effect. In all probability the present position can be put
down to the mutual exchanges between regions, academic disciplines, experts,
politicians, etc., that the discussion of a NWICO and, not least, the MacBride
Commission broke ground for. 
In conclusion
The issue of a New World Information and Communication Order that occupied
the UNESCO agenda in the 1970s is unique in that for once, international diplo-
macy and policy-makers acknowledged the international character of the media,
their structures, world-views and markets. 
Some of the developments during this past decade could be discerned
on the horizon even when efforts were being made to create a NWICO. Indeed,
increasing concentration of media ownership, monopolization of markets, and a
decline in diversity were among the complaints that the third world countries and
others raised. However, it was quite impossible to envisage the breadth and
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depth of what was to come in the closing decades of the century. The globaliza-
tion in the media system, spurred by deregulation and privatization, concentra-
tion, commercialization and, not least, new information technology, could not be
foreseen in its manifold entirety. It was these developments that ultimately sealed
the fate of the NWICO as an issue. 
The globalization of the media has accelerated and the digital divide
has widened in recent years, and international information and media issues are
once again in focus on the international agenda. Even if the points of departure
and terms of reference used today are quite different from those in the 1970s,
‘development’ is still bound up with the modernist project of the Western world.
Today, however, solutions to the problems and issues are not sought in top-down
steering and regulations on an international scale. Contemporary society is far
too complex for that, and discourages the thought of ‘a new international order’
of the sort envisaged in the 1970s. We now see an era of multilevel governance
of the media and communication system –an interplay between many different
actors, public and private, on multiple levels, from the local to the global.
One of the main items on the global agenda today is the World
Summit on the Information Society, WSIS. Arranged by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in partnership with, among others, UNESCO,
under the high patronage of the UN Secretary-General, its anticipated outcome is
“to develop and foster a clear statement of political will and a concrete plan of
action for achieving the goals of the Information Society, while fully reflecting all
the different interests at stake”7. Among the fundamental ideas behind the WSIS
is an ambition to create a more inclusive Information Society and to bridge the
digital divide in a North-South perspective. 
Many have expressed concern that the WSIS has come to apply an
increasingly technical perspective to issues relating to telecommunication and the
Internet. Many voices, not least within the civil society, have called for more atten-
tion to the media, human rights and communication rights in the final document;
that is to say, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and not least its Article
19, which emphasizes freedom of expression, and the principles of a free flow of
information, a free circulation of ideas, freedom of the press, participation in the
communication process, the right to communicate, cultural diversity, and so
forth, are once again in focus. Critics have also seen a danger in marginalizing
traditional media, as the WSIS has tended to do. They point to negative conse-
quences, particularly in the poorest countries, not least relating to the advance-
ment of human rights. 
When the final WSIS document is adopted in 2005, 25 years will have
passed since the MacBride Commission submitted its report to UNESCO. Like the
MacBride Commission in 1985, the WSIS has identified important issues and
problem areas with regard to global information and communication. Regardless
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of one’s overall judgement, the WSIS also must be credited with new thinking
with respect to how information and communication issues may be handled in
the global arena; the governance perspective is truly something new. However, it
will require hard work to ensure that the information society, or the knowledge
society in UNESCO’s parlance, stands for the attainment of basic economic, social
and political rights for people around the world. The significance of the WSIS will
depend on the extent to which national governments, the private sector, the civil
society and other relevant stakeholders are brought into the continued work
towards these goals.
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